Cristian Rivera
I am a PhD candidate in Politics at the University of Cambridge. My work focuses on four interrelated questions in normative political theory:
1) How do people judge what is in their interests?
2) How do representatives judge constituents’ interests?
3) Do groups have interests of their own above those of individuals?
4) How should we design political institutions?
My research explores how disputes surrounding these questions descend from long-running debates in the history of political thought, and how tools from different fields in analytic philosophy (i.e. philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, social ontology) can help us either make better sense of these disputes or transcend them by imagining alternative visions of politics.
Writing
“Majoritarian Democracy without the Discursive Dilemma”
Abstract
The discursive dilemma maintains that incoherent collective judgments can result from the aggregation of coherent individual judgments on logically connected propositions. For democratic theory, the implication is that if democratic institutions such as assemblies are to be coherent, they must forgo responsiveness to the individual attitudes of constituents and have “minds of their own.” To achieve this, proponents of the dilemma argue that democratic institutions should adopt particular procedures, such as deliberation and public reason, and institutional models, such as the republican state. This paper, however, argues that this is a false choice. There are alternative ways out of the dilemma that don’t force us to choose between responsiveness and coherence. This paper presents one such approach developed in the computer science literature and argues that adopting it brings us closer to satisfying important democratic imperatives. It also suggests that the approach bolsters majoritarian approaches over republican alternatives.
“Knowledgeable but Useless?: Political Agency is Motivational, Not Just Epistemic”
Abstract
Much has been written on the epistemic merits and defects of democracy. Most epistemic arguments – whether for or against democracy – claim that empowering knowledgeable citizens or improving the broader epistemic environment would result in better political decisions. To define the standard of good decision-making, influential epistemic theorists appeal to the model of an ideal epistemic agent with omniscient foresight or expert knowledge. This paper argues that this picture of the ideal epistemic agent rests on an inadequate account of agency. Ideal epistemic agents can identify the best course of action and act otherwise. In response, this paper advances an alternative theory of ideal agency that incorporates motivational aspects along with epistemic ones. It then explores how this revised account might reframe important political questions typically understood in epistemic terms, such as climate inaction, and reassess forms of political organization often maligned by epistemic approaches, such as the party.
“Representation as Interpretation”
Abstract
The “Constructivist Turn” has emerged in the last decade as the dominant strand of theorizing on political representation. This movement’s main contribution has been to challenge the “standard” view of representation, which sees representation as an activity where representatives “read off” the pre-existing interests of the represented. Constructivists argue that this view of representation is paradoxical, for representatives have a hand in shaping the very interests they represent. Representation must start with the representative, who “reads in” rather than “reads off” the interests of the represented. But constructivism leaves notions concerning the legibility of pre-existing interests, responsiveness, and the evaluation of representatives relatively unaddressed. This paper advances a novel account of representation that draws from Donald Davidson’s theory of interpretation in the philosophy of mind. It argues that by conceiving of representation as an interpretation, we can reconcile the insight at the heart of constructivism with these concerns. The result is an account that successfully synthesizes two sides of a long-running dichotomy in representation theory.
Education
Prior to my PhD, I completed an MPhil at the University of Cambridge and a BA at the University of Southern California. Please get in touch for the most recent version of my CV.
